It seems like you and I are reading "unpredictable" in very different ways.
Yes. I agree. Well, sort of.
First, you only get to predictable results if there's a collection of references that collectively teach the limitations of the claim. In that particular patent (DRM), I don't believe there was any reference teaching a binding of publication of private information to something such that the owner of the private information would also protect privacy of the bound thing.
As a result, there were inadequate "familiar elements" to combine "according to known methods" to do "no more than yield predictable results."
So, perhaps this key binding claim isn't a good example as it never even gets to the "predictable results" analysis due to inadequate "familiar elements".
Of course, what I'd expect examiners trained under the Dudas regime to argue is that "confidential information" is just text and to examine the claim as if "confidential information" had been amended to recite "text". Of course, the easy rebuttal is to simply ask for some text and then to ask for the text on their credit card(s). If there's no meaningful distinction, they shouldn't mind sharing all text -- since text is text. (Can you tell I argue against this sort of nonsense all the time?)
Getting back to "predictable results", I think you're looking at the claim and looking for something unpredictable. That's not the inquiry. That's clearly impermissible hindsight reasoning. And, if that's how that passage was implemented, you'd be absolutely right -- any claim not reciting something spectacular and unexpected would be obvious.
Here's how I see that passage of KSR. Let's say the prior art of record teaches all the limitations of a claim (familiar elements). Let's say that the methods by which the teachings of that prior art collectively can be combined is known (combined using known methods). Lastly, let's say that the results of the combination would be predictable, generally speaking (producing no more than predictable results). Without showing all 3 of those elements, the quoted passage of KSR re predictable results does not come into play.
Once those 3 things are shown, I would expect that the burden shifts to the applicant to show that something extraordinary happens with the combination, some results that are not predictable. If we can't allow the PTO to force us to prove a negative, we should expect them to prove the negative of no unpredictable results.
Let's just say that, as I think over recent arguments I've made regarding non-obviousness, this passage of KSR does not affect the way I amend/argue in any way.
I still argue that the combination does not collectively teach each and every limitation of the claim (inadequate familiar elements).
I still argue no motivation to combine or that the combination would be inoperable or any of the other improper combination arguments (not combined using known methods).
I still argue unpredictable results (no more than predictable results), if I ever get that far and really need to. That can involve things like teaching away, or just counter-intuitive results.