The motivations must be known to those of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made.
Agreed. But I don't see how that point is bolstered by your list of drawbacks.
My point is that there is no motivation to combine a tire iron with a USB thumb drive. Who here wouldn't think, upon seeing a USB thumb drive duct-taped to a tire iron in a friend's trunk, "what a dumb-funk!"? The test seems to be whether an examiner can name
any motivation to combine references. That's not what the law requires.
I can add data storage capacity to an ordinary automobile windshield by duct-taping USB thumb drives to the windshield. And one would motivated to do so because it would add data storage capability to an ordinary windshield, right? NO!! If one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that an important end served by a device would be defeated by the combination, there is no motivation to combine. Think about motivation to decrease temperatures in automobiles by painting all windshields with completely opaque flat black spray paint. Obvious? Hell no!
But, more importantly, just naming a motivation is not enough. Suppose at some point in the future that flat black spray paint can be opaque from one direction and transparent from the other direction. Fine, obvious then, right? No, there must be some showing that this motivation (i) existed at the time the invention was made and (ii) was known to those of ordinary skill in the art.
In short, here's what I'm seeing (though more recent rejections are getting much better):
One of ordinary skill in the art would be motivated to combine the references because [insert any motivation at all].
Here's the very least we ought to be seeing:
One of ordinary skill in the art would be motivated to combine the references because [insert a motivation that actually motivates, as in makes the thing better in some way without defeating its raison d'etre]. This motivation was known to those of ordinary skill in the art as evidenced by [prove that the motivation was known by those of ordinary skill in the art]. Since [provide actual evidence that the ordinary artisan knew of this motivation before the invention was made], the ordinary artisan knew this motivation at the time the invention was made.
Anything short of that fails to make a prima facie case of obviousness.
Regards.
I know that on appeal the TSM argument may work, but does it hold water anymore with examiners since KSR?
I've said this before, so I'm repeating myself.
The TSM test was to make things easier for the PTO. KSR did not eliminate the TSM test but rather indicated that it is just one way to show obviousness. Without the TSM test, a showing of obviousness goes back to Graham. And, when was the last time anyone here saw detailed findings on the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made? If anyone has seen that, I'd love to see it. It'd by like snorkeling and seeing a celocant swim by.
The TSM test was a way to get around that -- we can usually presume that one or ordinary skill in the art can read. Accordingly, showing a motivation to combine in the manner claimed obviates having to show that the ordinary artisan would have thought of it; it's right there in black-and-white. Ditch the TSM test and you have to produce detailed factual findings on the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made.
In KSR, the PTO successfully lifted themselves out of the frying pan and into the fire. Of course, the frying pan is still available as TSM is still a legitimate way to show obviousness.
Regards.