Jim, you are wrong that insignificant post-solution activity is discarded by the Bilski court. That corollary was not part of the Freeman-Walter-Abele test but in fact was around before Diehr and confirmed by the Diehr Court, as explained in the text of Bilski. The court clearly affirms the use of this corollary on Page 16-17.
Well, I'll respectfully submit that insignificant post-solution activity
was part of the Freeman-Walter-Abele test -- not that it originated there but was an integral part of it. I stand corrected that
Bilski retained the notion.
Here is a blog post about some recent system claim rejections under Bilski: http://bpaiwatchdog.blogspot.com/2009/03/bpai-confirms-101-rejection-of-method.html
Interesting.
In the method claims, the BPAI indicated that the method could be performed purely in the human mind (perhaps with pencil and paper). It's entirely unclear to me how one, using only her mind, could "identify[] co-evolving regions in the memory of a target application" wherein the memory is presumably computer memory and the target application is presumably executing in the computer. I'm inferring that this is pretty clear from the corresponding Spec. We've got some computer geeks perusing the forums here -- go ahead, without using a machine, identify some co-evolving regions of memory used by an application. Oh, feel free to use pencil and paper if it helps.
Abele would have provided good guidance here, if it were still good law. Using a number that can only be acquired through use of a CAT scan machine implies sufficient extra-algorithmic activity to recite more than just the algorithm itself.
In the Beauregard claims, the BPAI said, "We see no reason why a “computer readable medium” containing “instructions” for the otherwise ineligible method should be treated any differently from the non-statutory method recited in instant claim 1. Although a “computer readable medium” may nominally fall within the statutory class of “manufacture,”[] claim 10 would effectively pre-empt the abstract idea represented by instant claim 1."
So, if a method that is ineligible solely for not requiring a computer actually
does require a computer, that doesn't save it? Okay, suppose the "instructions" are a simple text document stored on a CDROM such that the computer becomes merely a display device -- a stretch, but I'll go with it for the sake of argument. The claim didn't include the language that I typically use: "instructions which, when executed by a computer, cause the computer to [preamble stuff] by: [steps] ."
If the claim covers word processing documents with instructions to human beings to do the pencil-and-paper version of an ineligible method, ... okay. I'll accept that for now as ineligible.
In the system claim, ... wow ... the BPAI gave up all pretense of giving any weight to the fact that the claim recited a machine and treated it as a method -- citing only precedence ruling on method claims. I'm having trouble grokking the gross misapplication of the law. Could it be that the influence of Dudas is making its way into the BPAI?
Business method patents cover methods of doing business.
Thanks. And circular reasoning is reasoning that goes in a circle. A deep fryer is something that fries deeply.
Again, given that there is no meaningful categorization in US patent law and never has been (at least at the appellate level -- Federal Circuit and its predecessor courts), I don't have to sweat the lack of a clear definition.
Regards.